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mereological essentialism
Mereological essentialism is a philosophical thesis about the relationship between wholes and their parts, and the conditions for their persistence. It holds the view that objects have their parts essentially, implying that if an object were to lose or gain a part, it would cease to exist—that is, it would no longer be the original object but a new, different one.
== Definition ==
The above statement of mereological essentialism requires some elaboration. First, what types of objects: abstract or concrete objects? Mereological essentialism is most commonly taken to be a thesis about concrete material objects, but it may also be applied to a set or proposition. A proposition, or thought, if mereological essentialism is correct, has its parts essentially; the concepts that make up the proposition are essential to it.
Further, in the case of material concrete objects, mereological essentialism can be true in different senses depending on how such objects are thought to persist through time, these senses going under the names endurantism and perdurantism. Mereological essentialism for enduring objects - objects that persist by being wholly present every instant, means that the enduring objects only have their spatial parts essentially. Mereological essentialism for perduring objects - objects that are spread out with parts both in space and time, have also their temporal parts essentially in addition to their spatial parts.
Finally, what does it mean for an object to have something essentially? The usual way to explain essentiality is by reference to necessity or possible worlds. Mereological essentialism is then the thesis that objects have their parts necessarily or objects have their parts in every possible world in which the object exists.
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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